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The purpose of this study was to demonstrate the relative
effectiveness of the three major Regular Army (RA) commis-
sioning training sources based on the performance of the
graduates of each source. The historical development of
human resource accounting (HRA) was traced from its origin
in the Labor Theory of Value and Human Capital Theory . The
present state of HRA measurement research was examined.
Criteria for selection of a human resource investment model
were discussed. A human resource valuation model (HRVM) was
adapted from prior research and applied to the measurement
criteria of the study. A set of models were developed to
measure the Army's human resource investments in the RA
Maneuver Combat Arms officers commissioned from the USMA,
ROTC, and OCS in calendar years 1952 and 19 54. The Army's
monetary investments in graduates of each source were calcu-
lated based on historical retention and promotion data. The
results of the study were mixed; however, given specific
assumptions, the ROTC offered the highest relative return
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I. INTRODUCTION
The consideration of humans as factors in economic
production traces its origins to the Labor Theory of Value
conceived by 18th and 19th Century economists. They proposed
that commodities be valued in accordance with the amount of
labor necessary for their production. The maturing impetus
of that economic notion led a century later to the more
specialized study of Human Capital Theory . Within Human
Capital Theory labor is valued as the amount of capital
invested in a worker and the anticipated benefits to be
returned to society from that investment.
The quantification and prediction of these values stimu-
lated the interest of accounting theorists, who sought to
measure such economic events and their implications to formal
organizations. The evolution of that theory produced the
idea of Human Resource Valuation . Successive refinements
eventually led to a branch of accounting known as Human
Resource Accounting (HRA) . Within HRA an organization's
human work-force is regarded as a commodity to be valued
according to a firm's investment in employee recruitment,
education, training, and compensation. The amount of these
investments is then used as a basis upon which future bene-
fits to the firm are predicted.
Although the primary focus of HRA has been directed to
the private sector, its potential application to government
10

organizations is no less consequential. The U.S. Army, as
the military service with the highest ratio of manpower to
capital equipment in the Department of Defense, faces an
especially critical problem in seeking the maximum return
on its substantial investments in human resources.
This study considers the attrition of commissioned offi-
cers from the Army as a loss of human resources and examines
the relative rate of return on the investment in human
resources of the three primary sources of commissioning.
11

II. HUMAN RESOURCE ACCOUNTING
A. ECONOMIC ORIGINS
Accounting for people as an organizational resource in
much the same way as more traditional accounting methods have
dealt with other organizational assets is the underlying
philosophy of the HRA approach. The concept traces its ori-
gins to the general economic idea of the valuation of human
labor as expressed in the Labor Theory of Value by the econo-
mists Adam Smith and David Ricardo. They proposed that
goods are exchanged in the marketplace in accordance with
the amount of labor required in their production. Smith
(1776) stated:
The annual labour of every nation is the fund
which originally supplies it with all the
necessaries and conveniences of life which it
annually consumes, and which consist always
either in the immediate produce of that labour,
or what is purchased with that produce from
other nations. (p. 5)
Ricardo (1817) further proposed that "The value of a commodity
. . . depends on the relative quantity of labour which is
necessary for its production, and not on the greater or
less compensation which is paid for that labour" (p. 11)
.
Armed with the idea of the value of human labor in
generating economic benefit to the individual firm, theorists
began to view an organization's human workforce as a corner-
stone of all other productive assets. Fisher (1906) , who
investigated the relationship between capital and income,
12

contributed significantly to the analytical framework con-
structed by later economists. Knight (19 44) examined the
relationship between improvements in the quality of the
labor force and a firm's return on that investment. Mincer
(1958) continued the thrust of earlier research by inte-
grating human capital and income distribution theories, and
formulated a set of valuation models incorporating schooling,
experience, and earnings as variables in determining the
ultimate value of human resources.
B. HUMAN RESOURCE ACCOUNTING
Accounting and other social science researchers attempted
to more fully describe and measure the economic events
delineated in Human Capital Theory . Becker (1964) , Denison
(1962), Kendrick (1961), and Likert (1958) investigated the
relationship between a firm's investments in the education
and training of its work force and employee productivity.
They generally concluded that a firm could not disregard
the importance of such investments in the generation of
income.
Brummet, Pyle, and Flamholtz (1968) defined HRA as the
process of identifying, measuring, and communicating infor-
mation about human resources to facilitate effective manage-
ment within an organization. In its 19 73 Report, the Com-
mittee on Human Resource Accounting of the American Accounting




1. Measurement ; The development of models and methods
for measuring the cost and value of people to organiza-
tions,
2. Applications ; The design of operational systems
to implement these measurement methods in actual
organizations, and
3. Cognitive and behavioral impact : To determine the
behavioral impact of the HRA measurements and frameworks
on human attitudes and behavior (i.e., decisions and
performance) [AAA, 1973, pp. 169-85].
The first and second objectives deal with the problem
of the valuation of human resources, and are directly related
to the analysis conducted in this study. The third objec-
tive is concerned with the behavioral questions that emerge
when the valuation is undertaken, and is beyond the scope
of this study.
C. HRA MEASUREMENT RESEARCH
This section discusses valuation methods which have
resulted from HRA research.
HRA measurement research may be classified into cost
based and value based [Ogan, 1976a]. Cost based measure-
ments, as developed by Brummet, Flamholtz, and Pyle (19 69)
are concerned primarily with the historical costs incurred
by an organization for the recruiting, training, and com-
pensating of its employees. Such historical cost based
measurements attempt to represent the firm's investment in
14

its human resources. Additionally, Flamholtz (1974) con-
ceived an HRA system designed to measure positional replace-
ment cost using current employee acquisition, training, and
attrition costs as major cost factors. Value based measure-
ments, as defined by Flamholtz and Lundy (19 75) , are the
discounted present value of future incomes expected to be
earned by an employee. Flamholtz and Lundy also introduced
the notion of employee expected conditional value . It is
defined as the value of a person who reaches maximum potential
and reamins with the firm until normal retirement. This is
contrasted to employee expected realizable value , which is
defined as the value of a person who leaves the firm prior
to normal retirement. The primary distinction between these
two values is the probability of pre-retirement employee
turnover.
An HRA literature survey conducted by Puett and Roman
(1976) identified additional HRA valuation methods. One
method is that proposed by Hekimian and Jones (1967) . The
method suggests two possible ways of determining the value
of an employee: 1) by using the capitalized value of the
individual's salary, or 2) by using the value of an individual's
talents based on their scarcity in the labor market.
The different measurement techniques proposed offer
managers alternative methods to capture both the amount of




D. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The Army presently procures officers from three major
commissioning training sources: 1) Officer Candidate School
(OCS) ; 2) the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and
3) the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) . The costs of these
programs differ widely [GAO, 1975]. The USMA, in particu-
lar, has been the subject of considerable scrutiny with regard
to training costs, pre-graduation attrition, and graduate
retention on active duty. Canby (19 72) questioned not only
the high costs of a USMA education, but challenged the need
for college trained officers in non-technical specialties.
Ellis and Moore (1974), Glick (1971), and Heise (1969)
criticized the high costs incurred in producing USMA gradu-
ates in light of the apparently less costly alternatives
provided by ROTC and OCS. Galloway and Johnson (19 73)
expanded on earlier cost concerns and questioned the moti-
vation and influence of USMA graduates in the Army.
Pre-graduation attrition, training methods, graduate
retention on active duty, and the high costs of USMA in
comparison with other commissioning sources were the focus
of attention in a comprehensive report prepared by the
General Accounting Office (GAO) [GAO, 1975] . This formed
the basis for later hearings conducted by the U.S. House of
Representatives [U.S. House of Representatives, 1976].
Although these inquiries focused on the costs of each
commissioning source and briefly surveyed the problem of
USMA graduate retention, they did not compare the returns
16

to the Army of each source as a function of costs. What
was not demonstrated was the relative effectiveness of each
source compared to the training, salary, and fringe benefit
investments in the graduates of each source. This study is
an attempt to demonstrate the relative effectiveness of
each source based on the performance of its graduates.
In seeking to measure officer effectiveness, the Army
compares actual performance to desired performance. Desired
performance is extended active service to the Army in posi-
tions of increasing responsibility [DA, 1979] . The measure
of commissioning source effectiveness considered in this
study is the attainment of desired performance by the gradu-
ates of each source, as determined by graduate retention
and promotion.
This study evaluates the Army's relative rate of return
on its investment in human resources. A model drawn from
HRA research [Ogan, 1976b] is utilized to evaluate the Army's
investment in the regular army (RA) maneuver combat arms
(MCA) graduates of each source. The MCA are Infantry,
Armor, Field Artillery, and Air Defense Artillery.
17

III. MEASURING THE INVESTMENT IN HUMAN RESOURCES
This chapter presents the HRA valuation model utilized
in this study. The criteria used to select the model are
discussed. The method for calculating the monetary amounts
of the Army's invesment in human resources is explained.
The model is then selected and the model variables are
discussed.
A. CRITERIA
The valuation model selected was required to meet seven
essential criteria developed for this study: 1) it must
include a measure of the recruiting and training costs;
2) it must include a measure of the costs of continuing pro-
fessional education and training; 3) it must include a mea-
sure of the costs of salaries and fringe benefits; 4) it
must include a measure of the value of retirement annuities;
5) it must include the probability of retention in the organi-
zation; 6) it must include the quality of employee performance;
and 7) it must be applicable to a hierarchically structured,
service-oriented organization whose members perform pre-
scribed tasks within well-defined levels of responsibility.
These seven criteria provide a means to evaluate the major
dimensions of the total investment in and, therefore, the
value of an employee to an organization [Flamholtz, 1974].
The first and second criteria are measures of the Army's
monetary investment in an officer prior to commissioning
18

and after entry on active duty. The third and fourth cri-
teria measure the monetary amount of the income stream paid
to an officer during that officer's career and after retire-
ment from active duty, and are an expression of the worth
of an officer's services as perceived by the Army. The
fifth criterion, adjusts the ultimate amount of the income
stream to account for varying lengths of individual service,
since the amount of salary, fringe benefits, and the retire-
ment annuity is contingent upon when an officer leaves the
Army. Similarly, the potential costs for future education
and training are obviated when an officer leaves the Army.
The sixth criterion influences the probability of an officer's
retention on active duty. A history of poor performance
will prevent promotion to higher grades and ultimately result
in involuntary separation from the Army. The seventh cri-
terion is necessary for the identification of a model that
will be applicable to the structure of the army.
B. MODEL SELECTION
The first three of the seven selection criteria were
met by a method that was utilized for the initial application
of HRA at the R.G. Barry Corporation in 1966. Brummet,
Flamholtz, and Pyle (1969) documented that application, which
was based on the premise that the costs incurred in recruiting,
training, developing, and maintaining employees represent an
organization's investment in its human resources. The major
limitation of the R.G. Barry application, in terms of this
19

study's selection criteria, was its failure to consider the
value of an employee's retirement annuity, the quality of
employee performance, the probability of employee retention
with the firm, or its applicability to the structure and
mission of the Army.
Subsequent research into possible valuation models and
their application to operational organizations [Alexander,
1971; Carper, 1973; Flamholtz, 1972, 1973, 1974 and Flamholtz
& Lundy, 19 75] focused on three input quantification methods:
1) historical cost measurement; 2) positional replacement
cost; and 3) individual employee valuation. In a refine-
ment of these earlier attempts, Ogan (1976b) operationalized
a human resource valuation model (HRVM) at a certified public
accounting firm, using individual employee valuation as the
primary input measurement. The major model determinants
used were: 1) monetary value benefit potential; 2) an
individual performance index comprised of an efficiency index
and a standard work index; 3) maintenance costs (i.e.,
salaries and wages); 4) start-up costs (i.e., recruiting
and initial training) ; 5) training and development costs;
6) the probability of continued employment; and 7) the
probability of survival. The determinants were utilized to
compute a net monetary benefit and a certainty factor . The
net monetary benefit was multiplied by the certainty factor
and converted to periodic certainty equivalent net benefits .
Considering the time value of money, the periodic certainty
20

equivalent net benefits were discounted and aggregated to
arrive at the adjusted net present value patterns of an
employee for the organization. Ogan ' s HRVM is shown
schematically in Figure 1.
Although Ogan ' s HRVM was applied to the valuation of
employees in the private sector, its comparison with the
essential model criteria of this study reveals a direct
applicability. Table 1 presents the relationship between
Ogan ' s model determinants and the valuation model criteria
of this study. Table 1 shows two areas of disagreement
between Ogan's HRVM and the study critiera: 1) the model
selection criteria includes the value of an officer's retire-
ment annuity, whereas Ogan's model does not; and 2) the
model selection criteria do not include an employee's
monetary value benefit potential , whereas Ogan ' s model does
.
Ogan's model was accepted as the basic model with some
modifications
.
The extent to which Ogan's determinants meet the model
selection criteria is discussed below. Additionally, the
means by which the determinants in Ogan's application and
the determinants used in this study were measured are dis-
cussed.
1. Recruiting and Training Costs
Recruiting and training costs are those incurred by
the Army as a result of the recruiting and pre-commissioning
training of an officer candidate. Ogan defined these costs












































Comparison of Study Criteria and Ogan's HRVM Determinants
Study Criteria
1) Measurement of recruiting
and training costs
2) Measurement of costs
of continuing education
and training
3) Measurement of costs of
salaries, cash supplements,
and fringe benefits
4) Measurement of retirement
annuity value





6) Considers quality of
officer performance

































Ogan did not attempt to measure these costs because
no formal records were available in the firm he studied.
The Army, however, makes such costs a matter of record
[DMC, 19 76] . In this study, recruiting and training costs
were measured by computing the monetary amounts incurred by
the Army in the recruiting and training process prior to
commissioning. Such costs were allocated to a commissioning
source and treated as the cost of producing an officer from
a particular source. The cost for each pre-commissioning
source program includes recruiting publicity; installation
operation; logistical support; uniforms; transportation;
training materials; personnel support, including instruc-
tor's salaries; and candidate salaries. The costs incurred
by those who fail to complete a pre-commissioning source
program were also allocated to the total costs of producing
each graduate [U.S. House of Representatives, 1976]. The
cost data for each commissioning source were obtained from
the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
(DCSPERS) , DA, and are expressed in 1979 dollars.
2 . Continuing Education and Training
Continuing education and training costs are those
incurred by the Army incident to formal education and train-
ing after commissioning. Ogan defined these costs as training
and development costs .
Ogan measured these costs by recording the expenses
associated with educational, training, and executive
24

development programs that employees should be expected to
attend. The costs of tuition, travel, living expenses,
training and program supplies were allocated to the training
and development costs determinant.
In this study, in which costs actually incurred
rather than expected costs were used, continuing education
and training costs were measured by computing the monetary
amounts incurred by the Army as the result of officer atten-
dance at basic and advanced branch (occupational specialty)
courses, the Command and General Staff College (C&GSC) , and
the Army War College (AWC) . Logistical support, training
materials, and personnel support costs were allocated to the
total continuing education and training cost. The cost data
were obtained from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-
mand (TRADOC) , and are expressed in 19 79 dollars.
3. Salaries, Fringe Benefits, and the Retirement Annuity
Salaries, fringe benefits, and the retirement annuity
are three components of the total monetary compensation paid
by the Army to its officers. Each component is discussed
separately, then compared to Ogan ' s maintenance cost determinant
Military salary is comprised of two components:
1) basic pay, which is the base amount of military compen-
sation; and 2) cash supplements. Cash supplements are quar-
ters and subsistence allowances and the tax advantage resulting
from the exemption of quarters and subsistence allowances
from income tax assessment. Canby (19 72) calculated the value
25

of cash supplements as 4.1 percent of basic pay. Military
salary increases with progression in rank and increased
years of active service.
Military fringe benefits are defined as medical care,
and commissary and retail exchange store privileges, and
comprise 14.9 percent of basic pay [Canby, 1972]. Non-
compensation items of military pay that are associated with
special job-related risks (e.g., hostile fire pay), or are
situational in nature (e.g., family separation allowances),
are not considered in this study.
The military retirement annuity is the largest com-
ponent of military compensation after basic pay [Canby, 19 72]
A military member attains retirement eligibility upon com-
pleting 20 years of active federal service, and draws retire-
ment pay until death. The annuity is calculated at 2.5 per-
cent for each year of active federal service and multiplied
by the terminal basic pay. The maximum annuity amount is
75 percent of terminal basic pay, and is reached at the com-
pletion of 30 years of active federal service [DOD, 1969].
Ogan's comparable determinant, maintenance costs
,
was defined as the monetary value of salaries and fringe
benefits which would accrue to an employee as the result of
promotions to higher levels of responsibility in the firm,
and was measured by the total compensation paid to each
employee. Ogan did not, however, account for the value of




Since the deferred compensation offered by the mili-
tary retirement system is a large portion of the fringe bene-
fits offered by the Army to career officers, it was included
in this study. Moreover, Ogan's estimate of maintenance costs
in the firm he studied were measured according to management's
perception of each employee's promotion potential, and the
salary increases that would result from promotions. The
comparable costs for each Army officer were not based on the
present perception of promotion potential and attendant
salary increases on the part of superiors. They were based
instead on the past record of performance and promotion poten-
tial, as recorded on Officer Evaluation Reports (OER) by pre-
vious superiors and represented by actual promotions. The
accumulation of a number of OER prior to each promotion and
retention decision affords a measurement basis less subject
to short-term fluctuation and individual supervisor percep-
tions than that utilized by Ogan. Additionally, this study
measures historical rather than purely predictive data.
Military salary data were obtained from tables pub-
lished by the U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center
(USAFAC) . The current values of cash supplements, fringe
benefits, and retirement annuities were computed from USAFAC
military salary data.
4. Probability of Retention on Active Duty
The probability of the retention of an officer on
active duty is defined as the probability that, once com-
missioned, an officer will remain on active duty until normal
27

retirement. The definition for the model selection cri-
terion and the determinant in Ogan's model are identical.
Ogan ' s data were gathered from employee satisfaction
surveys and management's expectations that employee satis-
faction and attitude toward changes in the organizational
environment were indicators of the probability of remaining
with the firm. Ogan used, therefore, management's opinion
of the probability of continued employement with the firm
for each employee.
The measure of retention probability used in this
study is different from Ogan's. The measure used here is
the probability of retention on active duty until normal
retirement for each officer, based on historical records.
The data were taken from historical retention data, drawn
from the Register of Graduates of the USMA, published annually
by the Association of Graduates, USMA; and the Official Army
Register
,
published annually by the Office of the Adjutant
General, U.S. Army.
5. Probability of Survival
The probability of survival is defined as the proba-
bility that an officer will remain alive for the period of
time known as the average lifetime. The average lifetime
for the officers considered in this study was defined by
the Division of Vital Statistics, U.S. Public Health Ser-
vice, as 65.6 years [TWA, 1978]. The definition for the
model selection criterion, and the determinant in Ogan's
model are identical; however, the data used in this study
28

were drawn from a different source. Ogan ' s data were based
on the Commissioner's 1958 Standard Ordinary Mortality-
Table [CRC, 1964] . The probability of survival for each
Army officer was measured by tables provided by the Army
Mutual Aid Association (AMAA) . The AMAA, which insures only
Army officers, recognizes the combat exposure of its younger
members by using a special mortality table through age 59
[AMAA, 1979] based on the American Experience Mortality Table
At age 60, the AMAA reverts to the Commissioner's 195 8 Stan-
dard Ordinary Mortality Table. Although the special table
recognizes the combat exposure of younger officers, no
differences between members in the MCA and other branches
are considered [Hanst, 1979].
6. Quality of Performance
Quality of performance is defined as how well indi-
viduals do at their jobs [Vroom, I960]. In assessing the
quality of employee performance, Ogan used an individual
performance index determinant, which contained two components
1) the efficiency index ; and 2) the standard work index .
The efficiency index is defined as an employee's efficiency
in theperformance of a given task. The standard work index
is defined as the type of work an employee should perform
according to that employee's position in the firm.
The efficiency index was measured by management's
perception of each employee's efficiency in the performance
of a given task and intuitive feelings regarding the future
performance of each employee. The standard work index
29

measurement was based on the subjective expectations of
management as to the type of work an employee should perform,
given the employee's position.
In this study, the quality of performance was measured
by utilizing the results of the Army's Officer Evaluation
System (OES) ; that is, the promotion decision. The quality
of an officer's past performance and promotion potential are
recorded on OER, which form the basis of the OES. OES, in
turn, is the basis for promotion decisions. Under OES,
superiors evaluate an officer's performance and promotion
potential at least annually. The proper range of an officer's
activities, expressed as a duty position description, is
included in each evaluation. The accumulation of a number
of OER prior to each promotion determination affords a long-
term picture of each eligible officer's potential for promotion
[DA, 1979]
.
7. Compatability with Army Organizational Structure
The firm in Ogan ' s study was structurally similar to
the Army. Both organizations have pyramidal structures with
clearly defined levels of authority; both provide services
rather than the manufacture of goods; and the members of
both organizations perform prescribed tasks according to
levels of authority and responsibility defined by the organi-
zation. Additionally, both organizations are characterized
by entry level positions from which new members progress to
increased levels of salary, authority and responsibility.
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The resulting similarities provide a basis for consistent
measurement of the investments made by each organization in
its human resources.
8. Consideration of Monetary Value Benefit Potential
Ogan's determinant is defined as the maximum benefits
an employee can generate for the organization. It was measured
by the billing rate multiplied by the chargeable hours of
each employee. Similarly, each officer in the Army can be
thought of as generating benefits in terms of national defense;
however, the full development and operational izat ion of a con-
cept such as "contributions to national defense" is beyond
the scope of this study. This determinant was, therefore,
excluded.
C. THE AGGREGATE VALUATION MODEL
The complete investment valuation model, adapted from
Ogan's HRVM, for a cohort of officers may be expressed as:
iik = =ik + Q. k + Tik + W. k (1)
where:
I.. = The time adjusted value of the total
investment in a cohort of officers
commissioned in year "k" from source
"i";
C., = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the total recruiting
and training cost of a cohort of offi-
cers commissioned in year "k" from
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Q., = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the cost of
continuing education and training
of a cohort of officers commissioned
in year "k" from source "i";
T., = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the cost of total
military compensation (base pay,
cash supplements, and fringe bene-
fits) of a cohort of officers com-
missioned in year "k" from source
"i"; and
W., = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the retirement
annuity of a cohort of officers com-
missioned in year "k" from source
For a cohort of officers commissioned in year "k"
from source "i", the time adjusted value of the commissioning
cost, C-^/ maY be expressed as:
n
C, = 7 (V. • X.) (1 + r) n
"p (2)
—lk L . —ip —lp=l
where
n = The number of periods over which
the training is received;
p = The period training;
V. = The recruiting and training cost forip
source "i" in period "p"
;
X. = The number of MCA RA officers com-
missioned from source "i"; and
= The discount rate.
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For a cohort of officers commissioned in year "k"
from source "i" , the time adjusted value of the cost of
continuing education and training, Q- v , may be expressed as
where:
Q., = D. + E. + F. + H. (3)
—lk —l —l —l—i '
D. = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the cost of the
basic branch course for officers
from source " i";
E. = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the cost of the
advanced branch course for officers
from source "i"
;
F. = The time adjusted value at the time of
commissioning of the cost of the C&GSC
for officers from source "i"; and
H. = The time adjusted value at the time
of commissioning of the cost of the
AWC for officers from source "i".
The time adjusted value at the time of commissioning
of the cost of the basic branch course for officers from
source "i" may be represented as:







p_. = The proportion of officers from source
"i" remaining on active duty at the
beginning of training in year "t";
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X- k = The number of MCA officers originally
commissioned from source "i" in year
"k";
S = The training cost of the basic branch
course;
r = The discount rate; and
t = The number of years after year "k"
in which the training occurs.
The time adjusted value at the time of commissioning
of the cost of the advanced branch course for officers from
source "i" may be represented as:




(5)1 (1 + r) t
where:
p_. = The proportion of officers from source
"i" remaining on active duty at the
beginning of training in year "t";
X., = The number of MCA officers originally
commissioned from source "i" in year
"k";
U = The training cost of the advanced
branch course;
r = The discount rate; and
t = The number of years after year "k"
in which the training occurs.
The time adjusted value at the time of commissioning




P-4. * X., • Y
= -it -ik - (6)1 (l + r) r
where:
£., = The proportion of officers from source
"
i" remaining on active duty at the
beginning of training in year "t";
X., = The number of MCA officers originally
commissioned from source "i";
Y = The training cost of the C&GSC;
r = The discount rate; and
t = The number of years after year "k"
in which the training occurs.
The time adjusted value at the time of commissioning
of the cost of the AWC for officers from source "i" may be
represented as
:




p_. = The proportion of officers from
source "i" remaining on active duty
at the beginning of training in
year "t";
X., = The number of MCA officers originally
1
commissioned from source "i" in year
"k";
= The training cost of the AWC;
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r = The discount rate; and
t = The number of years after year "k"
in which the training occurs.
The time adjusted value at the time of commissioning
of the cost of total military compensation (base pay, cash
supplements, and fringe benefits) of a cohort of officers
commissioned in year "k" from source "i" may be represented
as:
30 ,
"ik til (l + r)*
10
ytEijkt • ^ijkt it+ - o4i[£ijkt • ^ijkt ]t
+ .149[E ! • BP ]t] (8)
where
p_! ... = The proportion of officers com-
^ missioned from source "i" in year
"k" who are at rank "j" and are




= The corresponding base pay of an
x
^ officer commissioned from source
"i" in year "k" who is at rank "j"
and is in the Army at year "t";
= The number of years after year




.041 = The fraction of base pay (decimal
equivalent) represented by cash
supplements [Canby, 19 72];
.149 = The fraction of base pay (decimal
equivalent) represented by fringe
benefits [Canby, 1972];
30 = The maximum number of years of
service which can be credited for
pay purposes [DOD, 1969]; and
10 = The maximum pay grade an officer
can hold (0-10 or general) [DOD,
1969]
.
The time adjusted value at the time of commissioning
of the retirement annuity of a cohort of officers commissioned





8 k ' *ikt
^ = I ~TT ,t ^
t=7T ik (1 + r)
9 8 = The maximum age an officer may be
expected to attain [AMAA, 1979];
L., . = The probability of survival in year
± "
"t" for an officer commissioned
from source "i" in year "k";
R., . = The retirement pay in year "t" for
a cohort of officers commissioned
from source "i" in year "k"
;
= The year of retirement, measured




it . , = The earliest year in which an
officer commissioned from source
"i" in year "k" can retire (normally
20 years) [DOD, 19 69]
;
r = The discount rate; and
k = The year of commissioning.
The retirement pay in year "t" for a cohort of offi-
cers commissioned from source "i" in year "k" may be repre-
sented as:
30 10
^ikt " l t I *ijktf * Sijktf (10)
where:
t' = The year of retirement, in which
t' £ t;
tt ! = The earliest year in which an
officer from source "i" can retire
(normally 20 years)
;
30 = The maximum number of years of
service which can be credited
for retirement pay purposes;
j = The rank or pay grade at retire-
ment;
10 = The maximum pay grade an officer
can hold (0-10 or general)
;
A..,.., = The number of officers commissioned
—in kttJ in year "k" from source "i" and
at rank "j" in year "t 1 ", and
retire in year "t"; and
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-ijktf The retirement pay of officers
commissioned in year "k" from
source "i" who retire at rank
ii -i ii in year "t and retire
in year
The retirement pay computation formula developed for
this study for an officer commissioned in year "k" from
source " i" and who retires in year "t" at rank "j" may be
represented as:
Sijktf = 5Eijktt' * -0" YR. . t . . , (11)—ijktf
where:
BPijktf The terminal base pay of officers
commissioned in year "k" from
source "i" and at rank "j" in
year "t 1 ", who retire in year
"t";
—ijktf The years of service (up to 30)for retirement of officers com-
missioned in year "k" from source
"i" and at rank "j" in year "f ",
who retire in year "t" ; and
.025 The decimal equivalent of the
annuity calculation factor,
which represents 2.5 percent for
each year of active federal
service, up to the 30 year maximum
[DOD, 19 69].
D. SUMMARY
The valuation model constructed here treats training
and compensation costs as components of the total training
investment. The benefit the Army realizes from this training
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investment is the performance of the graduates of each
commissioning source. The following chapter introduces




IV. DATA COLLECTION AND MANIPULATION
This chapter discusses the collection of data for use
in the models presented in the preceding chapter. Time
adjusted values (TAV) of the costs of commissioning, con-
tinuing education and training, total military compensation,
retirement annuities, and the total monetary investment in
the graduates of each source are presented. Also, the total
investment per graduate remaining on active duty at the end
of the 20th and 25th years of active federal commissioned
service is presented.
A. COHORTS SELECTED
The USMA, ROTC, and OCS cohorts that began active com-
missioned service in 1952 and 1954 were considered in this
study. Two years were selected to permit interperiod com-
parisons. These particular years were selected for the
following reasons: 1) they provide a record of experience
past the initial voluntary retirement option at 20 years of
service, 2) they provide an indication of career commitment
beyond the 20-25 year retirement eligibility points when the
majority of voluntary retirements occur [Official Army
Register , USMA Register ] , 3) the similarity of external
influences upon the cohorts such as economic conditions and




1. Data Collection Procedure for USMA Graduates
A list of USMA graduates by name in calendar years
1952 and 1954 was compiled from a manual search of the 1979
USMA Register . This publication lists graduates by class
and contains the present military status of each officer.
If a graduate is no longer in the service, the reason (e.g.,
death, resignation, retirement) for departure is listed.
Each name was checked against successive annual editions of
the Official Army Register (OAR ) , beginning with the edition
documenting the first year after commissioning. The search
was conducted twice, with one individual conducting the first
and a different individual conducting the second search.
The OAR lists each active RA officer by name, grade, date
of birth, date of commissioning, military education level,
branch of service, Social Security Account Number (SSAN)
,
and civilian education level. Years in which individual
officers were promoted, attended formal military schooling,
or departed from the Army were thus determined.
2. Data Collection Procedure for ROTC Graduates
A list of graduates by name in calendar years 1952
and 1954 was compiled from a manual search of the OAR in
which graduates from each year first appeared, the 1953 edi-
tion for 1952 graduates and the 1955 edition for 1954 gradu-
ates. Successive annual editions of the OAR were then
checked by two individuals to determine years in which
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individual officers were promoted, attended formal military
schooling, or departed from the Army.
3. Data Collection Procedure for PCS Graduates
None of the 1952 or 19 54 graduates from OCS were
appointed to the RA upon commissioning [DoD, 1952a, 1952b,
1954a, 1954b] ; therefore, an alternative procedure for
determining comparable contributions of the OCS to RA strength
in 1952 and 1954 was used. Army regulations provide a pro-
cess for OCS graduates with outstanding performance records
to seek and obtain appointments in the RA during the years
following commissioning [DoD, 1952a, 1952b; DA, 1958, 1966].
This process if termed RA integration.
RA integration could happen at any point in an offi-
cer's career; however, a specific number of years of service
had to be determined as a starting point in determining the
number of OCS integrations to the RA. Nineteen years of
service was selected. The rationale for this selection is
discussed below.
a. Opportunities for RA Integration
Opportunities for RA integration are constrained
by statute. Title 10, United States Code (USC) and the Offi-
cer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1949 define the maximum
RA officer strength by grade. The number of available
appointments to the RA is therefore determined by the differ-
ence between the number of RA officers serving at each grade
and the statutory maximum for each grade.
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Since the Army officer grade structure is roughly
pyramidal in shape, the opportunities for RA integration by
OCS graduates necessarily diminish at higher grades and
corresponding increased years of service. The final oppor-
tunity for RA integration normally occurs by the completion
of the 19th year of service. The 19th year of service is
also the last year prior to an officer's initial voluntary
retirement opportunity, which occurs at the completion of 20
years of active federal commissioned service [DoD, 1969]
.
b. Selection
The 19th year of service is therefore the point
at which virtually all RA integrations have occurred and the
cohort strength has not been reduced by the initial voluntary
retirement opportunity. Consequently, the OAR in which OCS
graduates who had completed 19 years of service appeared was
screened and the names of those graduates listed. Previous
annual editions of the OAR were then checked by two indi-
viduals to determine the years in which these officers were
promoted or attended formal military schooling. Retirement
and promotion data for the 20-25th years of service were
collected by checking successive annual editions of the OAR .
The bias introduced by this procedure is discussed below.
4. Results of Data Collection
The number of officers commissioned from each source
in 1952 and 1954 is shown in Table 2. The number of officers
from each source who remained on active duty at the comple-





Number of Regular Army Officers Commissioned
Year of Commissioning
Source 1952 1954 Total
USMA 307 543 850
ROTC 492 193 685
OCS 243 186 429
TOTAL 1,042 922 1,964
Table 3
Number of Officers Remaining On
Active Duty At the End Of 20 Years Of Service
Year of Commissioning
Source 1952 1954 Total
USMA 186 212 398
ROTC 208 102 310
OCS 243 186 429




Number of Officers Remaining On
Active Duty At The End Of 25 Years Of Service
Year of Commissioning
Source 1952 1954 Total
USMA 79 93 172
ROTC 64 43 107
OCS 52 86 138
TOTAL 195 222 417
The number of officers commissioned in the MCA from OCS in
1952 and 1954 was approximately 2,100 and 800, respectively
[DoD, 1952a, 1952b, 1954a, 1954b] . Due to the large number
of MCA officers commissioned from OCS compared to the much
smaller number who were later appointed to the RA, the number
of officers from this source used as input for the invest-
ment models will bias the results. This bias is caused by
not counting the number of officers from OCS who were either
not appointed to the RA or who were appointed to the RA but
left the Army prior to the completion of their 19th year of
service. The effect of this bias is an understatement of
the total amounts of the investments incurred by the Army
to obtain an officer from the OCS.
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The ranks of the officers from each source who were
on active duty at the end of the 2 0th and 25th years of
service are shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7.
Table 5
Ranks of USMA Officers on Active Duty At The
End of 20 and 25 Years of Service
1952 1954























Ranks of ROTC Officers on Active Duty at the
End of 20 and 25 Years of Service
1952 1954
Rank 20 YOS 25 YOS 20 YOS 25 YOS
Major 6 6
(0-4)
Lieutenant 122 16 94 1
Colonel
(0-5)












Ranks of OCS Officers on Active Duty at the
End of 20 and 25 Years of Service
1952 1954
Rank 20 YOS 25 YOS 20 YOS 25 YOS
Major 3 3
(0-4)
Lieutenant 206 7 179 22
Colonel
(0-5)









TOTAL 243 52 186 86
49

The tables indicate that officers commissioned from the USMA
generally attain higher rank than their counterparts com-
missioned from either the ROTC or OCS . Moreover, USMA
graduates commissioned were more successful in attaining
general officer rank (Brigadier and Major General) than the
officers commissioned from any other source.
C. DATA MANIPULATION
The personnel data for each commissioning source were
arrayed in a two-dimensional matrix. The matrix indexed the
number of officers in the Army at each grade at the end of
a given year of service. A second two-dimensional matrix
indexed the number of officers who retired at each grade at
the end of a given year of service. Use of the matrices
organized the personnel data into a format which facilitated
the calculation of monetary investment amounts. The discount
rate used throughout the financial calculations was ten per-
cent, as established by Department of Defense (DoD) Instruc-
tion 7041.3.
The total time adjusted investment at the time of com-
missioning incurred by the Army for each cohort are expressed
in the following terms: 1) the total cost allocated equally
among the number of officers who were commissioned from a
source, expressed as the cost per graduate ; and 2) the total
cost allocated equally among the number of officers remaining
on active duty at the end of the 20th and 25th years of ser-
vice, expressed as the cost per officer. This arrangement
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permits a uniform comparison of the investments in each
cohort at specific points in time. These monetary investment
amounts are shown below.
1. Commissioning Cost
Table 8 shows the estimated cost of commissioning an
officer from each source in Fiscal Year (FY) 1980.
Table 8





Source . Precommissioning Program Branch,
Officer Division, Office of the
DCSPERS, DA, 19 79.
Table 8 shows the comparatively high cost incurred by the
Army in commissioning an officer from the USMA and the rela-
tive economy in commissioning an officer from the OCS.
2. Continuing Education and Training Cost
Inputting the data collected for this study into the
Continuing Education and Training Cost equation (3) and
allocating the costs among graduates produced the amounts




Time Adjusted Value Of Continuing Education
And Training Cost, Q- k / Per Graduate
1952 1954
Source Cost Per Graduate Cost Per Graduate
USMA $7,662 $4,412
ROTC 14,354 14,39 8
OCS 7,880 11,884
Neither USMA nor OCS graduates commissioned in 1952 and 19 54
attended basic branch courses [DA, 1958, 1966]; however, all
of the ROTC graduates commissioned in those years attended
a basic branch course. This is reflected in the compara-
tively higher cost shown for each ROTC graduate commissioned
in 1952 and 1954. Allocating the costs of continuing educa-
tion and training among the officers from each source who
remained in the Army for a 20 year career produced the amounts
shown in Table 10. Table 10 reflects the effects of officer
attrition. Officers from the USMA and ROTC who attended
formal military schooling but left the Army prior to the end
of their 2 0th year of service increased the amount of the
total investment, while reducing the final number of officers
among whom the investment could be allocated. This factor
was not present in computing the amounts for OCS officers




Time Adjusted Value Of Continuing Education
And Training Cost, Qi]^ Per Officer Remaining On
Active Duty At The End Of 20 Years Of Service
1952 1954




attrition for the first 19 years of service. The compara-
tively higher amounts shown for ROTC officers are also attri-
butable to the higher costs incurred as a result of their
attendance at basic branch courses in the first year after
commissioning
.
Allocating the costs of continuing education and
training among the officers from each source who remained in
the Army for a 25 year career produced the amounts shown in
Table 11. Table 11 shows the effects of officers from all
three sources who left the Army prior to completion of their
25th year of service. The higher costs incurred as a result
of ROTC officer attendance at basic branch courses and the
higher proportion of officers originally commissioned from
that source who did not remain in the Army for 25 years are
also reflected in the figures. The introduction of attrition




Time Adjusted Value Of Continuing Education
And Training Cost, Q^, Per Officer Remaining On
Active Duty At The End Of 25 Years Of Service
1952 1954




and 25th years of service are reflected in the greater amounts
shown for OCS officers commissioned in 1952 relative to
their USMA counterparts commissioned in that year.
3. Cost of Total Military Compensation
Inputting the data collected for this study into the
Cost of Total Military Compensation equation (8) and allo-
cating the costs among the graduates produced the amounts
shown in Table 12.
Table 12
Time Adjusted Value Of Total Military
Compensation, T., , Per Graduate
1952 1954
Source Cos t Per Graduate Cost Per Graduate





Table 12 shows that by allocating the costs among graduates,
the figures for OCS officers are greater than for either the
USMA or ROTC. This is attributable to the manner in which
OCS officers were counted, which excluded attrition for the
first 19 years of service. None of the OCS officers were
considered to have left the Army prior to their initial
retirement eligibility; the decrease in investment due to
attrition reflected in the amounts shown for other sources
in absent. Consequently, the number of officers for whom
the costs of total military compensation were computed is
the same at each grade for the first 19 years of service.
Allocating the costs of total military compensation
among the officers from each source who remained in the Army
for a 20 year career produced the amounts shown in Table 13.
Table 13
Time Adjusted Value Of Total Military Compensation, T.,,
Per Officer Remaining On Active Duty
At The End Of 20 Years Of Service
1952 1954






Table 13 reflects the effects of officer attrition. Offi-
cers from the USMA and ROTC who received compensation but
left the Army prior to the end of their 20th year of service
increased the amount of the total investment, while reducing
the final number of officers among whom the investment could
be allocated. This factor was not present in computing the
amounts for OCS officers because the manner in which OCS
officers were counted excluded attrition for the first 19
years of service. A comparison of the figures for USMA and
ROTC graduates shows that the cost per ROTC officer was
greater for both 1952 and 19 54 graduates.
Allocating the costs of total military compensation
among officers from each source who remained in the Army for
a 25 year career produced the amounts shown in Table 14.
Table 14
Time Adjusted Value Of Total Military Compensation, T.,
,
Per Officer Remaining On Active Duty
At The End Of 25 Years Of Service
1952 1954






Table 14 shows the effects of officers from all three
sources who left the Army prior to completion of their 25th
year of service. The cost for ROTC officers remains compara-
tively higher than for the officers from any other source.
Additionally, the cost per OCS officer commissioned in 1952
increased from the 20th to the 25th year.
4 . Retirement Annuity
Inputting the data collected for this study into the
Retirement Annuity equation (9) and allocating the costs
among the graduates produced the amounts shown in Table 15.
The AMAA mortality tables used in the calculations were based
on a retirement age of 4 3 years at the completion of 20 years
of service [AMAA, 1979]
.
Table 15
Time Adjusted Value Of Retirement Annuity,
W., , Per Graduate
1952 1954
Source Cost Per Graduate Cos t Per Graduate
USMA $13,425 $ 9,460
ROTC 10,318 12,244
OCS 28,877 24,099
The amounts shown in Table 15 are a direct result of the
number of officers who remain in the Army until their retire-
ment eligibility and actually retire. Because an officer's
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retirement annuity increases with the rank and number of
years of service completed at the time of retirement, the
grades and years of service at which these officers retire
is reflected in the amounts shown.
The comparatively higher amounts for OCS graduates
are the result of the greater proportion of officers from that
source who remained in the Army at the time of their initial
voluntary retirement opportunity, compared to the number who
were considered to have been originally commissioned. The
effects of this procedural data collection bias are reduced
when comparisons at the end of 20 years of service are
examined in Table 16.
Table 16
Time Adjusted Value Of Retirement Annuity, W.,
,
Per Officer Remaining On Active Duty
At The End Of 20 Years Of Service
1952 1954




Table 16 shows a comparison between the three sources at the
20th year of service. The effects of USMA and ROTC officer
attrition in the first 19 years of service reduced the number
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of officers among whom the total amount of retirement
annuities were allocated, which increased the amounts per
officer.
As the effects of officer attrition due to retirement
during the 20th through the 25th years reduced the number of
officers among whom the total amount of the retirement annui-
ties could be allocated, the figures shown in Table 17 emerged,
Table 17
Time Adjusted Value Of Retirement Annuity, W.,
,
Per Officer Remaining On Active Duty
At The End Of 25 Years Of Service
1952 1954




Table 17 shows an increase in the cost per OCS officer com-
missioned in 1952 who remained at the end of the 25th year
of service.
5. Total Investment
Inputting the data collected for this study into the
Total Investment equation (1) and allocating the costs among
the graduates produced the amounts shown in Table 18. Table
18 shows that the total investment per graduate is greater
for officers commissioned from the USMA than for officers




Time Adjusted Value Of Total Investment,
I . . , Per Graduate
1952 1954




The allocation of the Army's monetary investment among
individual officers who remained in the Army until the end
of their 20th year of service is shown in Table 19. The
Table 19
Time Adjusted Value Of Total Investment, I- k *
Per Officer Remaining On Active Duty
At The End Of 20 Years Of Service
1952









investment amount per graduate is influenced by the number
of officers from a source who leave the Army before attaining
20 years of service. Consequently, as the number of officers
60

from a given source remaining on active duty declines during
the first 20 years of service, the investment allocated
to those who complete 20 years increases. Table 19 shows
that the total investment per officer is greater for officers
commissioned from the USMA than for officers commissioned from
other sources.
The allocation of the Army's monetary investment among
individual officers who remained in the Army beyond their
first six retirement opportunities during the 20th through
25th years of service is shown in Table 20.
Table 20
Time Adjusted Value Of Total Investment, I-j-f
Per Officer Remaining On Active Duty 1
At The End Of 25 Years Of Service
1952 1954




Table 20 shows that the total investment per officer is
greater for officers commissioned from the USMA in 1954 than
for other sources. For officers commissioned in 1952, the




The results of the calculations shown in Tables 19
and 20 suggest the relative economy of the OCS in producing
career officers; however, the possible downward bias intro-
duced by the manner in which OCS graduate data were compiled
must also be considered. The possible effects of this bias
are discussed in detail in the following chapter.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Operationalization of the HRA valuation model developed
in the preceding chapter produced the monetary amount of the
Army's total training investment. The results showed that
the officers commissioned from the USMA in 1954 who remained
in the Army past their 25th year of service received a larger
monetary investment per officer than the officers from other
sources. For officers commissioned in 1952, the results
showed that the officers commissioned from the ROTC who re-
mained in the Army past their 25th year of service received
a larger monetary investment per officer than the officers
from other sources. Chapter IV presents a more detailed
interpretation and summary of the results and discusses the
implications of this study's findings.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviews the purpose of this study, presents
a general summary of the results, discusses the degree to
which the results achieved the study objectives and presents
implications for additional research.
A. STUDY OBJECTIVES
The purpose of this study was to demonstrate the relative
effectiveness of the three major RA commissioning training
sources based on the performance of the graduates of each
source.
B. RESEARCH RESULTS
Previous studies [Canby, 1972; Ellis and Moore, 19 74;
Galloway and Johnson, 1973; GAO, 1975; Glick, 1971; and Heise,
19 69] have focused on the costs of commissioning an officer
from the USMA and compared them to the costs of commissioning
an officer from either the ROTC or OCS . This study was used
to conduct a similar analysis; however, a larger investment
base was utilized to evaluate the commissioning alternatives.
The total investment in the officers commissioned from each
source was allocated among the officers who completed 20 and
2 5 years of active federal commissioned service.
The conclusions drawn from and the limitations inherent




a. Findings at the Time of Commissioning
The calculations indicate that officers who were
commissioned from the USMA in 1952 and 1954 represented a
higher total investment per graduate than the officers com-
missioned from any other source. This finding is consistent
with the conclusions of the earlier studies, which limited
their analysis to the comparative commissioning costs per
graduate.
b. Findings at 20 Years of Service
The calculations for officers who remained in
the Army until their initial voluntary retirement opportuni-
ties at 20 years of service revealed that an officer com-
missioned from the USMA represented a greater investment
than an officer commissioned from eithter the ROTC or OCS.
The 2 year investment figure was influenced by the number
of graduates from a particular source who were originally
commissioned but left the Army prior to the completion of
20 years of service. These officers increased the amount
of the total investment while remaining on active duty.
Their departure prior to the completion of their 2 0th year
of service, however, reduced the number of officers among
whom the total investment could be allocated.
The apparently less costly figures for officers
commissioned from the OCS must be interpreted in light of
the manner in which the data were collected. The data for
the USMA and ROTC were based on only the number of RA officers
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commissioned from those sources. None of the OCS officers
were appointed in the RA at the time of their commissioning;
therefore, an alternative means of identifying RA officers
was used. The number of officers commissioned from the OCS
who were integrated into the RA during their first 19 years
of service were counted. Consequently, the investments in
non-RA officers commissioned from the OCS were not considered,
nor were the investments in OCS officers who were appointed
to the RA but left the Army prior to the completion of their
19th year of service. This study, therefore, did not con-
sider any costs incurred by OCS officers who failed to com-
plete 19 years of service. This tended to ascribe greater
cost efficiency to the OCS commissioning source than would
be justifiable if all OCS graduates had been considered. The
results of this bias are less evident in the calculations
shown for officers who completed 25 years of service, because
of the effects of the attrition introduced by the retirement
of officers commissioned from the OCS as well as those com-
missioned from the USMA and ROTC.
The findings at 20 years of service indicate
that the USMA was a more costly source in commissioning offi-
cers who remained in the Army until the completion of 20
years of service than the ROTC.
c. Findings at 25 Years of Service
The investment per officer for those who completed
25 years of service reveals the effects of the first six
voluntary retirement opportunities on the number of officers
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who completed 20 years of service. The figures show that
the investment in the USMA officers who were commissioned
in 1954 and remained on active duty after the completion of
2 5 years of service is greater per officer than for any other
commissioning source. Additionally, the OCS offered the
least costly investment per officer who remained on active
duty for the same period of time.
The difference in the investments per officer for
those commissioned in 1952 is less dramatic. The figures
indicate that the money invested in the ROTC officers who
were commissioned in 1952 and remained on active duty after
the completion of 25 years of service is greater per officer
than for any other commissioning source. Moreover, the OCS
officers commissioned in 1952 show the lowest per-officer
investment.
The criterion for commissioning source effective-
ness used in this study is the attainment of desired per-
formance by the graduates of each source, as determined by
graduate retention and promotion. Applying that criterion
to the investments in the graduates of each source, it is
apparent that the USMA offered the lowest relative return
on the investment in human resources for officers commissioned
in 1954. For officers commissioned in 1952, the ROTC offered
the lowest relative return on the investments in human re-
sources. Concomittantly, the OCS offered the highest return
on that investment for officers commissioned in both years.
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d. Analysis of the Findings
The disparity in the results between the invest-
ment per officer who completed 20 years of service and the
investment per officer who completed 25 years of service is
primarily attributable to the rate at which officers from a
particular source retired between the 20th and 25th years of
service. The 20 year results indicate that the officers from
the USMA who were commissioned in 1952 represented a slightly
higher investment per officer than did their ROTC counterparts
The 25 year results, however, indicate that the costs per
officer commissioned from the ROTC were substantially higher
than for those commissioned from the USMA. A comparison of
Tables 3 and 4 reveals that 57 percent of the USMA officers
commissioned in 1952 retired; while 69 percent of the ROTC
officers commissioned in that year retired between the end
of the 20th and 25th years of service. There were, therefore,
proportionately fewer ROTC officers remaining at the end of
2 5 years of service among whom the total investment could be
allocated.
The effects of retirement attrition may also be
seen when the 20 and 25 year USMA and ROTC results are com-
pared for officers commissioned in 1954. The figures indi-
cate that 44 percent of the USMA officers retired in those
years; while 42 percent of their ROTC counterparts retired
during the same period. Equalizing the number of officers
commissioned from the USMA with the number of ROTC officers
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commissioned in the same year, the figures indicate that the
ROTC provides a more economical source of RA officers when a
comparable number of officers are commissioned and the attri-
tion rates are similar. Similar attrition rates are a
necessary assumption for the sake of this analysis. Further
analysis may indicate that ROTC graduates do, in fact,
experience a consistently higher attrition rate. Moreover,
the figures imply that when a comparable number of officers
are commissioned, the ROTC is more economical even when ROTC
officers leave the Army at a slightly higher rate. The
results of this study are, therefore, mixed; however, given
specific assumptions, the ROTC was a more effective means
of RA officer production, in economic terms, for 20 and
25 year careers than the USMA. When comparing the ROTC
and the OCS, the ROTC does not provide as economically
effective a source for RA officers as the OCS; however,
the effects of the bias introduced by the data collection
procedure for OCS officers must also be considered.
2 . Recommendat ions
The analysis of this study further suggests that
the Army should devote more resources to the ROTC program
with the goal of commissioning more RA Maneuver Combat
Arms (MCA) officers from that source and proportionately
fewer from the USMA.
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C. CONSTRAINTS ON GENERALIZATION
This study considered the relative return on the Army's
investment in the human resources commissioned from the three
primary RA MCA commissioning sources. It concluded that the
OCS offered the highest relative return on that investment
and the USMA the lowest. These conclusions, however, must
be considered in light of the limitations of the study.
1. Scope
This study considered only two representative years
of commissioning source experience, 1952 and 1954. It is
possible that a more detailed study including more years of
commissioning source experience would provide different
results due to a larger basis for comparison.
2. Data Limitations
The data for this study were gathered by a manual
search of the USMA Register and the OAR . Errors in trans-
cription may have occurred in the process of recording the
career information of the graduates of each source, even
though the data were checked for such errors. Of potentially
more significance is the bias introduced by the manner in
which OCS data were treated. A source of potential lost
investment is represented by OCS officers who were appointed
in the RA after commissioning but left the Army prior to the
completion of 19 years of service, and by OCS officers who
were commissioned but were never appointed to the RA. The
effect of this bias is an understatement of the total invest-
ment amounts allocated to the officers who were counted,

because the effects of lost investment due to attrition were
not considered. Consequently/ the investment amounts allo-
cated to the OCS officers who were counted at the end of
their 19th year of service represent investments received
only by those officers who were counted. An examination of
the gross number of officers commissioned from the OCS in
1952, and its effect on the per officer allocation at the
end of the 25th year of service, indicates that the OCS offi-
cers represented investments only slightly below that for
the ROTC officers, and substantially below that for the USMA
officers. An examination of the comparable figures for OCS
officers commissioned in 19 54, who showed a substantially
lower proportion of retirements than did the officers com-
missioned from any other source, suggests the relative conomy
of the OCS in producing officers, but only at particularly
advantageous (lower) rates of retirement.
3. Measurement
Commissioning source effectiveness was measured by
the number of officers commissioned from each source who
remained in the Army beyond the 2 5th year of service. While
this provides an indicator of commissioning source effective-
ness, it does not measure the contributions of a source's
graduates to national defense. It does not therefore, differ-
entiate between officers of the same grade who receive iden-
tical military compensation but whose jobs entail different
degrees of responsibility. Inasmuchas this condition may
exist, the development of such a metric could enable the Army
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to determine grade requirements for specific duty positions
at DA and DoD level organizations and eliminate or downgrade
those positions which currently require officers of higher
military rank and experience than actually justified. Con-
versely, such a technique may identify positions which should
be added or upgraded to require officers of higher military
rank and experience than currently authorized. Requirements
could then be forecast on a more economical basis in terms
of the training required to actually discharge the duties of
such positions.
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
This research was limited to an examination of the invest-
ments in human resources provided by the Army in terms of the
RA MCA officers commissioned from the three major officer
commissioning sources. Additional applications of HRA are
examined below.
First, the HRA method could be applied to a study which
considers a longer period of commissioning source experience.
The mixed results of this study indicated that some commission-
ing sources were more economical than others in a particular
year of consideration. A study which considers a larger
sample of experience in its analysis may provide more definite
results.
Second, the HRA method could be applied to the construc-
tion of cost models designed to determine an optimal accession
mix for future officer and enlisted soldier procurement. In
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this manner, the Army, using probabilistic modeling tech-
niques, could accurately forecast its officer and enlisted
requirements based on budgetary constraints and the expected
retention and investments required to support such a force
and the necessary training base.
A third possibility is the use of HRA in forecasting the
investments required to sustain the enlisted soldier specialty
training and reenlistment requirements based on the costs and
retention probabilities of enlisted soldiers. For example,
the amount of the training investment made in soldiers in
highly technical specialties could be considered the replace-
ment cost of such soldiers when they leave the Army. Monetary
reenlistment bonuses could then be geared to the savings
realized by retaining a soldier in the Army rather than
recruiting and training a replacement for that soldier.
Additionally, HRA could be used to demonstrate the loss
in human resources which occur as the result of Congressionally-
mandated reductions in force (RIF) . HRA could be used to
identify areas of false economy when trained, experienced
personnel are lost to the Army and their replacements must
be recruited, trained, and compensated.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter examined the effectiveness of the USMA, ROTC
and OCS in producing RA MCA officers based on the relative
return on the investment in the graduates of each source who
remained in the Army for 20 and 25 year careers. The results
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of the study were mixed. The results indicated that some
commissioning sources were more economical than others in
a particular year. However, given specific assumptions,
the ROTC offerred the highest relative return for the cohorts
considered.
The HRVM used used in this study offers a useful tech-
nique to financial and personnel managers for the maximiza-
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